what counts as law, find its systematic unity in the fact that it derives from an identifiable source which is distinct from morality. Hart's critics, notably Ronald Dworkin, focus on the question of how judges develop the law in the process of adjudication, arguing that the law develops not with the discretionary diktats of the judge acting as a kind of subordinate legislator but though a form of moral reasoning engaged in by the judiciary. While such theorists may not be particularly interested in seeking analytical systems in the law, other schools of thought -such as corrective justice theorists in private law -seek to find a logical unity within areas of legal doctrine, by using both conceptual analysis and moral philosophy.
Few of these schools now make much use of history in their argumentation -in contrast to nineteenth century jurists such as Savigny, who both argued that law reflected the people's consciousness, or Volksgeist, and that it was jurists dealing with legal concepts who articulated that consciousness. Where history is drawn on, it is rather by sociological or instrumental theorists, who wish to challenge the assumption of those theorists who take an 2 'internal' view and consequently concentrate their analysis on the language of jurists.
In their academic disputes, the combatants often seem to suggest that the law student needs to be persuaded that only one view accurately describes the world he inhabits. Yet it may be suggested that no single theory has the monopoly of truth. Neither does it have a monopoly of usefulness. Indeed, it is hardly to be expected that it would, given that different theories focus on different aspects of law, and that few now would attempt to create a holistic theory encompassing both law in general and the substantive rules it enforces. To understand law in its totality, we may find each of these theoretical approaches to be useful, while not necessarily definitive. 1 We may also find that it is useful, perhaps necessary, to look to history to understand the shape of the law. To illustrate this, we will in what follows explore how theory was used in the century and a half after the English civil war when a number of jurists did try -for the first time since the composition of the Bracton treatise -to create a holistic theory of the common law. The writers we will explore were not abstract theoriststhey were seeking to draw on theory for the very practical purpose of making sense of the law of their era. As shall be seen, they had great difficulty in making a single theory explain all that needed to be explained.
This was a novel enterprise. Although jurists before the civil war certainly thought deeply about the nature of legal reasoning and legal practice, they did not develop systematic theories of law and its content. For them, the common law was a system of special professional knowledge, or 'artificial reason', best manifested by legal argumentation in the courtroom. 2 As Sir John Dodderidge explained in 1629, the common law was 'not left in any 4 to attain to the Knowledge of them, but by a Tedious Wandring about, or with the Greatest Application and Long Attendance on the Highest Courts of Justice '. 5 In doing so, different jurists used different theories for different purposes. Although each of the jurists we will study saw himself as writing in a natural law tradition, this was an ambiguous heritage, for the law of nature could be seen either as the commands of a divine legislator, or as a set of principles of justice accessible to right reason. 6 It could be seen either as lex -a form of commanded rule -or as ius 7 -a sense of justice, generating a will to live honestly, not to harm others, and to give them their due. 8 As shall be seen, the first model was used particularly by those writers who sought to explain the nature of the state, and the rules of distributive justice which derived from that constitution. The pioneer in this field was Sir Matthew Hale, whose model was also followed by the first man to publish a complete set 6 Cf Digest 1.1.9. 7 The ambiguity can be seen in the phrasing of a passage at the start of Gratian's twelfth century deranging the juridical system. It must be remembered, how great a part of municipal law consists of positive institutions, having little or no original connexion with the principles of natural law and abstract justice; established at first arbitrarily, because it was necessary they should be in some way settled, and adhered to afterwards for the sake of uniformity of decision, which the welfare of the community demands. As in civil life rules of property must be instituted, they also must be permanent and stable
35
Why did these writers build their institutes around this 'positivist' model? Two reasons may be suggested. The first was practical. These writers were seeking to describe the body of the common law as a systematic set of rules which could be identified and described, and to explain their pedigree within the system. Just as political societies needed to have rulers, so they needed to be held together by rules. 'positivists' were not concerned with making an argument that law had no foundation in morality. Nor were they simply seeking to clarify concepts, so that it would be easier to distinguish the realm of the legal from the non-legal. Instead, they more concerned in identifying who had the authority to pronounce what that law was, and who did not.
II
If a positivist theory of law explained that there had to be a single sovereign power in any state, and showed that the law made by that power was binding, how was it to explain the authority of that sovereign, and the obligation of the people to obey it? How could it explain why the particular constitutional arrangements were authoritative? This was a central question for seventeenth and eighteenth century writers to address, writing in the aftermath of half a century of constitutional crisis.
In the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes had solved this problem by resting the authority of his sovereign on a legalistic social contract theory. His was a normative theory which explained the subject's duty to obey whatever laws the sovereign passed: for each subject was said to have authorised the sovereign by an act of his will when making the social 14 contract. 37 However, since this in effect preached obedience to whatever authority was established, and argued that sovereign power was by nature illimitable, it did not account for how sovereign powers might be limited by law, or how a constitution might change. The
Hobbesian route was therefore not one our seventeenth and eighteenth-century jurists wanted to take; for while they agreed with him in wanting to base the constitution on legal foundations, they wanted foundations which might define and limit the powers of constitutional actors, and to allow for constitutional modifications over time.
Nor did they take the approach developed by subsequent generations of English the problem that the Benthamic vision did not appear to allow for legally limited government through his theory of the rule of recognition, which was a power-conferring rule which might limit the powers conferred. However, Hart's rule of recognition -a customary rule of the officials of a system, who in effect made the rule by their customary practices -did not explain where the officials got their power from or how they were themselves constrained, nor did it explain the rules of change of the system itself, rather than the rules within it.
These were the problems which our thinkers needed to provide for, and they found their solutions in history. For them, the original power-conferring rule which gave powers to the constitutional actors had to be in some way a legalistic one: and for that reason, they were often tempted to follow Hobbes to a notion of a social contract. At the same time, in the absence of historical evidence of such a contract, they were often forced to invoke immemorial custom as evidence of an historical consent, which had acquired the status of law. An historical foundational moment was presumed, which in turn created a presumption of the legitimacy of institutions and the legal customs they enforced, which included the rules which determined how the constitution itself could be modified. Like the common law itself, these customs were legal customs in foro, in contrast to the general custom of the community, or customs in pays.
The notion that there was an ancient constitution, rooted in communal consent, consequently underpinned the constitutional theory of several of these writers. he did take much of his history from Hale, to construct an argument that while the origins of parliament were hidden 'in the dark ages of antiquity', they could be traced both in Saxon and Norman eras. In his view, the constitution was 'coeval with the kingdom itself,' and had been reaffirmed in several constitutional landmarks, including Magna Carta and the abolition of feudal tenures on the restoration of Charles II, which saw 'our ancient constitution' restored together with 'the complete restitution of English liberty.
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Wooddeson similarly sought to trace the roots of the English constitution to AngloSaxon times. Drawing on seventeenth century historians, he argued that the Anglo-Saxon witan had been composed of representatives of the people, as well as the crown and nobility.
If the Commons had been temporarily eclipsed after the conquest, the ancient constitution was revived in the age of Simon of Montford. His historical survey concluded that 'the English constitution has immemorially been in substance much the same, or has at least born a strong resemblance to the present system, although its influence was impeded, and its lustre obscured, for near two centuries by the obvious effects of the Norman invasion and tyranny.' 48 Like Blackstone, he felt that the constitution had been restored to its ancient 46 Hale, History and Analysis (n 13) 105, 108. 19 purity in later times. For these writers, the turn to history was not merely rhetorical or decorative: rather, an historical understanding of the constitution was essential to explain its authority, and so performed an important theoretical function.
It was not only the constitution which was to be understood by tracing the evolution of rules through particular historical moments. History was also used to explain the rules which made up the common law, which were seen as the product of positive imposition at specific times. 49 If these rules obtained their authority from moments of imposition, the coherence of their content could only be explained by tracing their history. The history employed by writers like Hale or his followers was not a contextual, or sociological one, but rather involved tracing particular rules to their origins either in legislation or in specific case law. It was, in other words, lawyers' history. Lawyers' history was employed, for instance, to explain the law of property, which was agreed by these writers to derive from positive imposition. As Blackstone explained, 'it is impracticable to comprehend many rules of the modern law, in a scholarlike scientific manner, without having recourse to the ancient.' 50 As in their constitutional writings, these jurists drew on a particularly legalistic view of history when discussing property rights: they held that the foundational principles of English land law had been introduced by constitutional consent at a specific moment in time. Blackstone accepted Sir Martin Wright's view that although the principles of the English system of tenures were derived from a pan-European feudal law, 51 the system itself had only been introduced into England by consent after the Norman Conquest, at a precise moment in 1085, 49 As Hale put it, many of these rules doubtless 'had their Original by Parliamentary Acts', which had then been developed by judges by building on ancient foundations, as cases came for decision. Hale, History and Analysis (n 13) 3. See also Lobban, History (n 2) 88. 
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when the council of the nation consented to its introduction by William. 52 The English were misled, Blackstone told his auditors, and 'Norman interpreters, skilled in all the niceties of the feodal constitutions' were able to introduce very 'rigorous doctrines' which it would take centuries to prune. It was still necessary to understand the ancient system, he argued, for although 'the oppressive or military part of the feodal constitution' was abolished root and branch, the constitution itself was not laid aside, and it needed to be understood 'to explain any seeming, or real, difficulties, that may arise in our present mode of tenure'.
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A similar approach was used to explain criminal law. Although it was acknowledged that many offences were violations of the law of nature -and might not need the signal of legislation to tell people that they were offences -it was generally agreed that positive law was needed to determine sanctions. 54 Hale noted that while many offences were prohibited by public law, either forbidding or commanding it.' 56 Wooddeson argued that the exercise of capital punishment was the greatest exercise of the 'legislative power', and said that it was for the legislature to judge of the necessity of imposing this penalty. 57 Much of criminal law could therefore be discussed in terms of the development of legislation, tracing which offences had been punished in which way over time.
The positivist/historical model developed by the theorists we have discussed suited their purposes, for it answered the questions which they sought to resolve. It allowed them to set out the parameters of the constitution, and the rules of property law and criminal law.
Using this method, Vinerian professors like Blackstone and Wooddeson, teaching English law to a non-professional audience, could set out briefly and clearly the rules which subjects and citizens most needed to know. However, this model of law did not explain everything a lawyer needed to know. In particular, it was unable to explain how judges should resolve disputes where the rules were unsettled, particularly in the law of obligations. Indeed, writers like Blackstone did not devote much time to exploring the nature of contract or tort. In part, this may have been because they the law of obligations as essentially ancillary -a law of wrongs (or actions) responding to breaches of rights. For some writers, it was possible to explain the law of torts or contracts in terms of the remedies created by positive institution.
As the author of an early eighteenth century Treatise concerning Trespasses explained, it was only 'thanks to our laws, and not the good nature of my neighbour' that anyone was protected 56 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) iv: 5. He went on to explain (at 8) that while in the state of nature, all had a power to punish, in civil society this power was transferred to the sovereign. The sovereign also had power to punish for mala prohibita, 'upon this principle, that the law by which they suffer was made by their own consent; it is a part of the original contract into which they entered, when first they engaged in society; it was calculated for, and has long contributed to, their own security'. However, this kind of analysis said little about the principles underpinning the law of contract or tort (or unjust enrichment); nor could it show judges how to develop these areas of law. Indeed, it was evident that there were also many areas outside the law of obligationssuch as the law relating to criminal capacity -where lawyers developed the law through legal reasoning which went far beyond the application of the rules of positive law. Discussing this issue, Hale explained that humans were liable to punishment by virtue of the fact that they had understanding and will, and consequently had a capacity to obey: 'where there is no will to commit an offense, there can be no transgression, or just reason to incur the penalty or sanction of that law instituted for the punishment of crimes or offences'. Since such a general view might offer too great an opportunity for people to escape punishment, he added, it had 'been always the wisdom of states and law-givers to prescribe limits and bounds to these general notions' and to define who could claim exemption from incapacity. Yet it was clear that this had not always been done by legislation: in the era of Edward III, he explained, the law relating to incapacity of age 'received a greater perfection, not by the change of the Common law, as some have thought, for that could not be but by act of parliament: but men grew to greater learning, judgment and experience, and rectified the mistakes of former ages and judgments.' 59 When it came to explaining how judges were to develop these kinds of principles, the positivist model proved incomplete, and those whose main interest was in 66 However, he omitted to mention Pufendorf's wider explanation of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary transactions, which showed that the latter were not really 'contractual'. Rather, where a party was made to pay damages for a wrong, the obligation rested 'upon that necessity of Restitution, which upon a Settlement of Property, evidently flows from the Laws of Nature'. 67 The flaws in Ballow's exposition were perhaps not particularly important, insofar as he explained that his interest did not lie in analysing the 'involuntary' transactions, but in explaining 'those particular Contracts, which are limited to the Benefit of certain Persons, and presuppose Property and Price'; 68 but it was to assume rather than demonstrate a natural law system which underpinned the rules he was to elaborate.
By contrast, Gilbert attempted a more philosophical discussion of the nature of natural law. Like Hale, he considered the law of nature to be the law commanded by God. However, where Hale had seen natural law in terms of the commands given by God to the sons of 65 Ibid 2.
66 S Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations trans B. Kennett, 2 nd ed (L Lichfield 1710) 620-1 (VIII.iii.5).
67 As Pufendorf explained, Aristotle had called the obligation to make satisfaction an involuntary contract, because the wrongdoer's obligation to pay damages did not depend on the victim's consent.
Noah, at the centre of which stood the command to keep one's promises, Gilbert conceived of natural law as a dictate of reason instructing man in the requirements of justice. The commands and prohibitions of God were very simple, and could be deduced once one recognised the existence of God and his creation of mankind: God commanded whatever led to the preservation of mankind, and prohibited what led to its destruction. In brief, 'all the laws of nature are reduced to this single head, to maintain an universal love to all mankind, and procure as much as in us lies the good of all men'. 69 As Gilbert explained, 'he that acts towards the preservation of the species, answers the primitive design of God Almighty, but he that acts any thing that tends to the destruction of the species disobeys the laws of nature.' 70 Since 'the preservation of every individual being' could be shown to be the will of God, it had 'the obligation or binding force of a law'. Furthermore, God had implanted in man not only a power of reasoning, but also 'a natural pity to the innocent, and an aversion to those actions, which if the table were turned would be very uneasy, and grievous to ourselves.' 71 A sense of good and evil thus pre-dated civil laws, which did not themselves generate criteria of right and wrong, but were judged by them. If men disagreed about right and wrong, and fell into discord, it was because they had been given free will, and were prone to be ruled by those appetites which were necessary for their self-preservation, with the result that the appetites might prove too powerful for their reason. But this did not mean that Since war led to the destruction of mankind (which was against God's will), men had to seek peace with each other. This meant in turn that 'no man ought to take away the life of an other without just cause', and that anyone who did so would commit 'the crime of murder'. 73 The foundations of property were also explained by similar reasoning: since man had a right to preserve himself, and a right to the means of self-preservation, he had a right to cultivate the earth and to keep the fruits generated by his labour. Property arose from occupancy of the means of self-preservation, which was made up of both an act of the mind and an act of the body: no one could have property 'without some act of his own, for nothing can tend to the preservation of any man without some application and relation to him'; and nothing 'can have any relation to him or the means of his preservation without his own judgment and consent'. 74 Once property was occupied with the appropriate intention, a man obtained a right which he could defend. He had a consequent right to defend the property from invasion (or to compensation for harm done to it), and he had a right to transfer it to others. Just as he had obtained property through an act of the will, so he could transfer it through acts of the will, found in contracts or testaments. In this way, Gilbert developed a natural law theory of property, contract and testament, which did not require the existence of a civil society: its 72 For the relationship between Hobbes's approach and Gilbert's see further Lobban, 'Thomas Hobbes' (n 37).
73 Gilbert, Treatise on the Law of Nature (n 61). Other forms of conduct which violated the principle of human preservation included 'the sin of lying', arrogance, ambition, and evil-speaking. Ayliffe, the route to justice was through right reasoning, rather than decisions of authority.
However, if the law of contract or tort might be explained by abstract reasoning, there remained many areas of law which could not be so explained. To begin with, as Gilbert explained in his posthumously published treatise on Devises, while the basic principles of the acquisition and transmission of property by contract and will could be figured out by reason in the state of nature, they could not explain the rules relating to English real property: for 'however reasonable this NATURAL notion may seem of transferring property by testament, it was not admitted into the feudal law; the reasons whereof will appear, if we examine into the 80 Ayliffe, New Pandect (n 9) 8-9.
81 Blackstone, Commentaries (n 11) i: 69. 
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In a similar way, Gilbert also explained the evolution of different political systems in more sociological terms. Rather than seeing the origins of political society in a Lockean social contract dating from one notional past moment, Gilbert saw political society emerging as primitive societies became richer and more refined; and suggested that the structure of the polity which emerged -whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy -would depend on socio-economic factors, primarily where the greatest concentration of land lay. When he turned to discussing English medieval history, the kind of history he wrote was also less 'constitutionalist' than writers such as Blackstone. In Gilbert's history, two major changes had followed the conquest. The first was that William had converted all allodial holdings into feudal tenures, so that all land was held of the king. The second was the creation of a new system of royal courts which took power away from more communal bodies. The king created a 'constant Court in his own Hall, made up of the Officers of his own Palace', which supplanted the popular Saxon witenagemot, which (Gilbert argued) had also heard appeals.
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He also granted commissions to sheriffs by writs of justicies, in 'the Norman form, by which all power of judicature was immediately derived from the Prince', which gave the sheriff the power to judge cases 'independent of the suitors of the county court.' 88 If these changes had increased the power of the king, the balance was soon redressed. For Gilbert explained that although for some reigns after the time of the Conquest, the barons were kept in subjection by the king -since 'the Norman and English Barons were a balance one for the other, the 35 after some time, the Normans became more Anglicised, and became fond of the liberties they had enjoyed in Saxon times. 89 In the baronial wars of the thirteenth century, they turned against the king, which led to a 'new policy in the kingdom': not only the conformation of Magna Carta, but the development of a parliament with two houses. For Gilbert, England's balanced, mixed constitution was the product of social forces over a period of time. It was not only the product of Norman barons seeking greater liberties in the thirteenth century, but also the product of the commons growing in power in the sixteenth, thanks both to Tudor attempts to weaken the nobility, and economic changes strengthening the gentry.
V
Each of the writers we have discussed were engaged in the very practical business of attempting to put the law of England into a coherent and systematic order. To assist them in this project, they turned to legal theory, seeking answers both about the nature of law and of legal reasoning. Jurists drew on a wide variety of theories and approaches, including positivism, natural law and 'internal' as well as 'external' legal history. Different theories were better placed to address different questions. As writers such as Hale and Blackstone found, constitutional law, the law of real property and criminal law were easiest to put into a 'positivist' frame, which derived all law from moments of positive institution, which could be traced through legal landmarks -even ones which (like the original contract) were conjectural. By contrast, the principles of the law of contract or tort were much harder to fit into this model, especially in an age with very sparse legislation on these topics, and a relative paucity of reported case law. Those scholars more interested in discovering the principles which lay behind these areas, such as Gilbert, developed natural law theories 89 Ibid 6.
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which did not rest on human legislation, but which could be worked out analytically. Yet their models could not explain the areas that the rival school's theory could -and so, to explain the law of real property or the constitution, they turned to a different model of history.
For each of these theorists, both theory and history operated as tools which could be used to get a better understanding of the law. The tools were far from perfect, and did not suit all the tasks they set themselves. Nor were the theories themselves always convincing.
However, they were tools which helped these jurists rethink the law and its organisation in productive ways. If they did not have the last word, it was because there was no last word to be had. Theory turned out to be ever provisional -a useful starting point to organise the law, and a useful model to explain parts of it, even if it proved incapable of explaining the totality.
By the nineteenth century, the ambition to put all of the law of England into a systematic form had fallen out of fashion: in this era, jurists made use of the analytical 'what is legal reasoning'? The history we have been engaged with in this essay might suggest that the aim to find one theoretical answer to such questions is equally utopian. Legal theory offers a box of tools, and different tools may be taken from the toolbox for different jobs.
